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Abstract 
 Islam is the extension of the monotheistic religions. It essentially 
claims for peace and tranquility but also allows war in some circumstances. 
War in Islam is referred to as jihad. However, jihad is border and includes 
spiritual struggle as well. Classical Islamic scholars interpreted combative 
jihad as self-defence against aggression and global war to spread Islam. The 
majority of modern scholars consider the political and cultural differences 
between the early periods of Islam and modern era. They interpret the concept 
as only self-defence and ask Muslims to resort to civil means to convey their 
message. However, some scholars and groups still follow the classical 
interpretation of the concept. Scholars generally set forth some preconditions 
for combative jihad. The preconditions are the existence of a reason, a 
purpose, permission of a legitimate ruler and adherence to humanitarian rules. 
ISIS launched intensive military attacks against the Islamic countries of Iraq 
and Syria between 2013 and 2014 and captured large areas after committing 
many atrocities and devastating the two countries. The group eventually 
announced an Islamic Caliphate and identified Abubakr al-Bagdadi as the 
Caliph. It later asked Muslims to pledge allegiance to its Caliph and join its 
ranks. This article argues that the ISIS war does not satisfy the Islamic 
jurisprudential conditions to be qualified as jihad because the group waged its 
war based on no religious reason for a political purpose without the 
authorization of a legitimate Islamic ruler and outside of the confines of the 
humanitarian rules. 
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Introduction 
 “By Allah, I have never witnessed the scholars who speak about 
matters of Jihad agree on criticizing and opposing a Muslim movement as 
they have agreed on condemning ISIS.” 
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Sheikh Abdullah al-Mahiseny  
 Islam is a monotheistic religion that claims to pacify and tranquilise 
life. It basically promotes the ideas of peace and tolerance among its followers 
and its followers and other people but allows war in some specific 
circumstances as well. Islam has a specific concept regarding war which is 
known as jihad. However, the scope of Jihad is linguistically and theologically 
broader and entails spiritual struggle as well.  
 Classical Islamic scholars refer to combative jihad as defensive and 
offensive jihad. Accordingly, defensive jihad is the use of force to defend 
Muslims and Islamic Caliphate from aggression and offensive jihad is a global 
war to spread Islam. Most of the modern scholars interpret combative jihad as 
only self-defence considering the political and cultural realities of today’s life. 
They require Muslims to resort to civil means to deliver their message to the 
world. However, there are some few scholars and schools that believe in the 
same classical approach to combative jihad. In addition to that the classical 
and modern scholars generally base jihad on the preconditions of reason, 
purpose, permission of a legitimate ruler and respect to humanitarian rules. 
 The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) is a radical Islamic group 
whose origins date back to the beginning of 2000s. The ideology of the group 
originates from Wahhabism which is the most violent view of the school of 
Salafism. The group initiated intensive military operations against Iraq and 
Syria in the name of jihad between 2013 and 2014 and consolidated control 
over large parts of the two countries. It eventually declared an Islamic 
Caliphate and announced the Iraqi extremist, Abubakr al-Baghdadi as the 
Caliph of Muslims.  
 ISIS waged its war against Iraq and Syria in which Islam is the main 
state religion and the majority of their populations are Muslim. The two 
countries posed no threat to the other Islamic countries and Muslim 
communities either. The group rather aimed to establish a Sunni Islamic state 
with the support of some Sunni Muslim countries in the Middle East. The 
group’s war was authorised by someone who had not religious legitimacy even 
after the Caliphate declaration as the majority of Muslims refused to give their 
bay’ah (allegiance) to him. ISIS moreover destroyed the two countries and 
perpetrated all the crimes that are known as the serious crimes of concern to 
mankind (The Rome Statute, 1998: Art. 5). Hence, the ISIS war dose not fulfill 
the jurisprudential conditions and cannot be defined as jihad.  
 The international media and politics have considered the topics of the 
theory and practice of jihad as well as ISIS and its war seriously but there is 
still a lack of a legal comparative study between Jihad and the ISIS war 
considering Islamic jurisprudence. The analysis of the ISIS war in light of the 
definition, scope and conditions of jihad leads to a better understanding of 
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Islam and the war of the global terrorist groups operate under the name of 
Islam.    
 The article attempts to illustrate the concept of jihad and nature of the 
ISIS war through answering some questions. While jihad is a misunderstood 
violent concept, what does jihad actually mean? What is the scope of jihad? 
Does jihad include combat? If yes, what is the nature of combative jihad? Is 
combative jihad a haphazard war or based on some jurisprudential conditions? 
What is ISIS? What is the true reason of ISIS for attacking Iraq and Syria? 
What is the actual purpose of ISIS in its war? Is the ISIS Caliph a legitimate 
Islamic ruler to authorise jihad? Does ISIS respect the humanitarian rules 
applicable during battle? 
 The article first addresses Islam in brief and clarifies jihad considering 
Islamic jurisprudence. It later introduces ISIS and examines the group’s war 
in light of the Islamic jurisprudential conditions.  
 
A brief overview of Islam 
 Islam is a monotheistic religion that has more than 1.57 billion 
followers today (Pew Research Center, 2009: 1). According to the historical 
traditions, the origins of Islam trace back to the first divine revelation sent 
down from God, through the angel Gabriel, to the Prophet Muhammad in 610 
in Hara cave, Mecca where the Prophet used to worship God alone during the 
months of Ramadan (Najeebabadi, 2000: 104-105; Armstrong, 2002: 3-4). The 
divine messages quickly became a faith and formed Islamic religion in the 
second decade of the 7th century (Ahmad, 2013: 11-18). After the prophet 
migrated to Medina in 622, Islam shaped political, social, economic and 
cultural life through the foundation of Islamic State (Kaka Khel, 1982; 
Berween, 2003; Tahir-ul-Qadri, 2012). The Islamic State covered the whole 
Arabian Peninsula in the second half of the 7th century and extended to North 
Africa and Spain in the west and India in the east by 8th century (Karsh, 2007: 
23). 
 Islam is theologically defined as the total and sincere submission of 
human to Allah (God). In Islam, God is one and incomparable who neither 
begets nor is born (The Quran, 112:1-4). He is the creator of all the creation 
(The Quran, 7:54). The sole purpose of the existence is to worship him (The 
Quran, 51:56). Islam, in other words, requires its adherents to surrender to God 
and profess to his oneness. Muslims must also believe in the angels, Prophet 
Muhammad and all the previous Prophets and Messengers who brought 
revelations and messages from God to mankind, the Quran and all the previous 
holy books, the authority of God over the destiny of human and the life after 
death (al-Uthaymeen, 2007: 20-90). These are the elements that constitute the 
Islamic creed. In addition, Islam requires its followers to perform some 
obligations including establishing five daily prayers, fasting during the whole 
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month of Ramadan, paying zakat which is giving a certain amount from assets 
to needy people, pilgrimage to the city of Mecca in today’s Saudi Arabia once 
in life. These obligations are known as the pillars of Islam (al-Uthaymeen: 15-
19). 
 Muslims believe that Islam is not a new message but the same pure 
primordial divine message that God delivered to the other Prophets and 
Messengers to guide their peoples (The Quran, 42:13; 3:84). However, it is 
the final, unaltered and universal version that is applicable to every single 
human on earth (The Quran, 33:40; 4:47; 21:107; 3:19, 85). From the logic of 
Muslims, Islam is more than just a mere individualistic faith; it is a 
comprehensive system that regulates all the life aspects from individual and 
family issues to social, political and economic matters. In other words, 
Muslims believe that Islam is a complete way of life and therefore spreading 
it is a duty upon every Muslim through either invitation or jihad. 
 Islam, these days, consists of two main denominations which are Sunni 
and Shi’a. The Sunnis constitute the majority of Muslims and are estimated to 
be between 85% and 90% and the Shi’as constitute the rest (Khalili, 2016: 41). 
Each sect entails various doctrines and schools which are all different 
jurisprudentially. Some schools believe in the common modern democratic 
means and spread Islam only through peaceful invitation while some others 
are very extremist that subject anyone who rejects their views to violence.  
 
Islam and War 
 Islamic scholars define Islam as the submission of human to God to 
live in peace while critics interpret Islam as the surrender of non-Muslims to 
Muslims to be safe. The absolute determination of the nature of Islam as a 
peaceful and violent religion is not logical as Islam entails the elements of 
peace and violence at the same time. Islam can be concurrently a peaceful and 
violent religion and can be neither a peaceful nor a violent religion like all the 
other divine and human ideologies claimed an ideal life to mankind but also 
practiced violence. War is not an element of the Islamic creed but rather an 
ideological tool to reach a certain goal in a specific circumstance.  
 The Quran and traditions of the Prophet Muhammad include many 
instances that encourage peace and reject violence among Muslims and 
Muslims and other people, such as:      
 “Whoever kills a human being unless it be (in retaliation) for murder 
or mischief on earth-it is as if he had killed the entire mankind. And whoever 
saves a life-it is as if he had saved the entire mankind” (The Quran, 5: 32). 
 “Indeed, Allah commands justice, goodness and giving to relatives and 
forbids immorality, evil deeds and oppression. He admonishes you that you 
might remember” (The Quran, 16:90). 
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 “The Muslim is the one from whose tongue and hand the people are 
safe, and the believer is the one people trust with their lives and wealth” (An-
Nasā'I, 2007: Hādith No. 4998). 
 Likewise, Islam allows and encourages war in some specific times and 
circumstances. There are many terms in Islam that imply war including 
ġazwah (military expedition), qital (fighting), harb (war), futuhat (conquest), 
fitna (religious division or civil war) and jihad.  Jihad is the most popular 
terminology in the Quranic verses and practices of the Prophet Muhammad. 
The reason is that the term of jihad is linguistically extensive and entails all 
the other terms and theologically, it is a war for the cause of God and not 
common human material purposes. However, jihad is still broader than the use 
of force and it is war by all means.  
 
Jihad  
 Jihad is perhaps the most misinterpreted Islamic term. It is still 
understood to be only the use of violence by Muslims against non-Muslims 
not only in the mind of non-Muslims but many Muslims as well. The concept 
of jihad is much comprehensive and multi-dimensional than being restricted 
to the use of force. Even through jihad certainly includes war, war in Islam is 
based on reason, purpose, circumstance and official authorisation of a 
legitimate ruler. 
 Islamic scholars translate the Arabic word of jihad literally as ‘struggle 
or strive’. Thus, jihad theologically is defined as the exertion of efforts in the 
way of God (Khadduri, 1955:55; Maududi, 1980: 5; Jihad and the Islamic Law 
of War, 2003: 1; Hayward, 2013: 51-52). According to the Quran and Hadith, 
striving in God’s cause is not only performed through war but also spiritual 
means.  
 “And those who struggle in Our cause, we will surely guide them to 
Our paths. And indeed, Allah is with the good doers” (The Quran, 29:69). 
 “And strive for Allah with the striving that is due to Him…” (The 
Quran, 22:78). 
 “Strive in the cause of Allah with your wealth and your lives…” (The 
Quran, 61:11). 
 “A believer who strives his utmost in Allah’s cause with his life and 
property” is the best one among the people (al-Bukhārī, 1997: Hadith No. 
2786). 
 “The best Jihad for women is Hajj (pilgrimage to mecca)” (al-Bukhārī: 
Hadith No. 2784). 
 Since the early periods of the Islamic history, there have been wide-
ranging scholarship debates over the interpretation of jihad. Islamic scholars 
have divided jihad into various categories. The categories generally entail 
spiritual and combative jihad. Spiritual jihad is inner strive against evil 
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temptations, doing and promoting good, avoiding and forbidding wrong and 
developing all the life aspects. Combative jihad is defined as taking part in 
battle in God’s cause (Al-Jawazyyah, 2003: 249-250; Ibn Rushd, 1325 (1907): 
259; Ibn Hazm, 1321 (1903): 135). It should be mentioned that the Combative 
jihad is regarded as the most controversial category of jihad among scholars.  
 Classical Islamic Scholarship generally divides combative jihad into 
defensive and offensive jihad (Mawardi, 1853: 89; Khadduri: 56-61; Peters, 
1996: 3-17; Moussalli, 2009: 17-18). Scholars define defensive jihad as war 
to protect Muslims and territory of Islamic Caliphate from aggressive acts. 
They refer to some Quranic verses to support their argument, such as: 
 “Permission to fight back is granted to those who have wrongfully 
been attacked…, those who have been expelled from their homes unjustly…” 
(The Quran, 22: 39-40). 
 “And fight in the way of Allah those who fight against you and do not 
transgress. Indeed, Allah does not love the transgressors” (The Quran, 2: 190). 
 “…expel them from wherever they have expelled you …” (The Quran, 
2: 191).  
 The second classical category of combative jihad is defined as global 
jihad. Scholars refer to offensive jihad as means to spread Islam and expand 
the territory of Caliphate. They believe that offensive jihad is neither 
aggression nor compulsory conversion but rather a way to convey Islam as the 
final divine message to the world. The scholarship argument on offensive 
jihad is also based on some verses of the Quran, such as: 
 “O you who believe! fight those disbelievers who are close to you and 
let them find harshness in you, and know that Allah is with those who fear 
Him” (The Quran, 9: 123). 
 “When the sacred months have passed, kill the polytheists wherever 
you find them and take them captives and surround them and lie in wait for 
them at every place of ambush. But if they repent and establish prayers and 
pay alms-tax, then let them go their way. Indeed, Allah is forgiving and 
merciful” (The Quran, 9: 5). 
 “And fight them until there is no more aggression and religion is for 
Allah. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except against the oppressors” 
(The Quran, 2: 193). 
  Unlike the classical scholars, the majority of modern scholars define 
combative jihad as the use of force in self-defence. However, they still believe 
in global jihad but not in a combative nature (al-Banna, 1978: 150-151; 
Ghannouchi, 1995; al-Buti, 1995: 44,92).  
 The scholars argue that the Prophet initially intended to convey his 
message only through peaceful means. He arranged academic debates to 
protest false beliefs and propagate Islamic principles. He delivered letters to 
neighboring and world kings to inform them about his divine message. He 
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never waged jihad until people refused any solution other than attacking him 
and his followers for insisting on the message. Based on the practice of the 
Prophet, the scholars believe that offensive jihad is not permissible as long as 
Muslims practice their religion and preach freely (al-Buti: 44; Kabbani).  
 In contrast, there are some few and unpopular scholars who follow the 
classical categorization of jihad (Qutb, 1990: 43, 50, 103, 104; Azzam). The 
scholars require Muslims not to neglect global jihad along with defensive 
jihad. However, they think differently regarding the manner of waging and the 
purpose of jihad.  
 The majority of classical and modern scholars hold the opinion that 
jihad must be directed under the leadership of a legitimate ruler and within the 
boundaries of the Islamic humanitarian rules applicable during battle 
(Kabbani; Moussalli: 18). 
  
ISIS 
 ISIS is a radical Islamic group which has been designated as a terrorist 
organization. The group has long roots which specifically started from the 
foundation of Jama’at al-Tawhid wa al-Jihad (The Group of God’s Unity and 
Jihad) by the Jordanian extremist, Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi in the beginning 
of 2000s (Zelin, 2014: 1). The goal of the group was initially establishing an 
Islamic state in Jordan but it failed there and moved to Iraq in 2002 (Hashim, 
2014: 4). The group later pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader, Osama 
Bin Laden and adopted the name of Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-
Rafideen (The Organization of Jihad’s Base in Mesopotamia), also known as 
al-Qaida in Iraq, in October 2006 (Hashim: 5). On 12 October 2006, the group 
joined some other groups and tribes and formed Hilf al-Mutayibeen (The 
Coalition of the Scented Ones) (Jihad Groups in Iraq, 2006). Some days later 
the Coalition announced the establishment of the Islamic State in Iraq (Bunzel, 
2015: 17).  
 In April 2010, the group appointed its Iraqi militant, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi as its new leader after a joint United States and Iraqi air raid killed 
its previous leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi (Hashim: 7). Following the start 
of the Syrian civil war in January 2012, some ISIS militants established an 
affiliated group in Syria and named Jabhat al-Nusra (al-Nusra) (Hashim: 11). 
A year later, on 9 April 2013, the ISIS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi 
announced the merger of both ISI and al-Nusra groups and adopted the name 
of ISIS (Bunzel: 25). Even though al-Nusra rejected the merger and reaffirmed 
its allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri (Bunzel: 25; Hashim: 
11), ISIS moved to Syria in June 2014 (Al Nusra pledges Allegiance, 2014). 
After entering Syria, the group started fighting the Syrian regime forces and 
all the rebel groups which refused to join it. By the end of June 2014, ISIS 
captured the southeastern province of Der al-Zawr, most of the northern al-
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Raqqah, the countryside of Aleppo in the north, most of the desert in the south, 
Yarmouk refugee camp in the southwestern Damascus, parts of the 
countryside of Homs in the west and the southern Palmyra city in Syria 
(Shaheen, 2015) and most of Anbar in the west, the entire northern Mosul in 
Neinawa and many cities in the northeastern Kirkuk, central Salahaddin and 
eastern Diyala governorates in Iraq (UNAMI and OHCHR, 5 June-5 July 
2014: 2,3,4). On 29 June 2014, ISIS announced an Islamic Caliphate on the 
occupied territories and identified Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its Caliph 
(Hashim: 14). 
 
The war of ISIS 
 ISIS Ideologically belongs to the school of Jihadi-Salafism. Jihadi-
Salafism requires Muslims to return to the pure teachings and practices of the 
prophet Muhammad and early Islamic generation and wage jihad against local 
secular rulers and external aggressors. However, the school entails various 
views that some are slightly moderate and some others are quite extremist.   
 If we look at the ISIS practice closely, we will understand that the 
group is much violent than the rest of the Jihadi-Salafi groups such as, al-
Qaeda, Taliban, al-Shabaab and Hamas. Therefore, scholars often define ISIS 
as a Wahhabi group. The Wahhabis are also Salafis but they believe 
themselves to be the only true Muslims and consider other Muslims as 
apostates or unbelievers. The pronouncement of a Muslim as an apostate or 
disbeliever is considered the most violent Islamic thought which is known as 
Takfirism. ISIS, in other words, can be defined as a Takfiri group. 
 ISIS started its military campaigns in the Shi’a predominant country 
of Iraq and against the Shi’a government of Syria while the two countries were 
already Muslim countries and considered Islam as the main state religion and 
the main source of legislation (The Iraqi Constitution, 2005: Art. 2; The 
constitution of the Republic of Syria, 2012: Art. 3). The two countries caused 
no threat to Islam, Muslims and no aggression to the territories of the other 
Islamic countries. If the group justified its military attacks by the fact that the 
two countries had adopted a secular system to rule the countries, the rest of 
the Arabic and Islamic world was similarly not based on the traditional Islamic 
governance. In addition, the territory of Iraq and Syria for the group’s 
Caliphate raised a doubt that the group was not actually conducting jihad but 
implementing a political agenda.  
 ISIS operated and concentrated mainly in the Sunni predominant 
governorates in Iraq and Syria. The group eventually captured large swaths of 
territory and sought to establish a de facto state that comprised of the Sunni 
areas in Iraq and the Sunni areas in Syria “the shūrā (consultative) council of 
the Islamic State studied this matter after the Islamic State – by Allah’s grace 
– gained the essentials necessary for khilāfah (Caliphate), which the Muslims 
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are sinful for if they do not try to establish” (This is the Promise of Allah, 
2014). The Caliphate announcement was never the goal of the group but it was 
just a plausible justification to convince the Islamic public opinion of the 
invasion, rejection of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria 
and breaking the recognized border lines, strengthen its ranks through drawing 
the attention of the other extremists and further expand its territory to 
undermine the non-Sunni domination in the Middle East.  
 With the Caliphate announcement, ISIS declared Abubakr al-
Baghdadi as the Caliph of Muslims and asked the local and world Muslims to 
give bay’ah to him and join the group “It is incumbent upon all Muslims to 
pledge allegiance to the khalīfah (Caliph) Ibrāhīm and support him…The 
legality of all emirates, groups, states, and organizations, becomes null by the 
expansion of the khilāfah’s authority and arrival of its troops to their areas…It 
is not permissible for a single person of you who believes in Allah to sleep 
without having walā’ (loyalty) to the khalīfah” (This is the Promise of Allah). 
Although Iraq and Syria are very diverse in terms of religion and ethnicity, the 
majority of the two countries’ populations is Muslim. The number of people 
who gave bay’ah to Abubakr al-Baghdadi and joined the group was less than 
several thousands and most were Sunni people within the areas under the 
control of the group. The respond of the world Muslims was similarly far less 
than the group’s expectation and the bay’ah was only given by some radical 
groups and individuals who traveled to Iraq and Syria and joined the group. 
Hence, the ISIS Caliphate is not the representative of the Muslim communities 
and Abubakr al-Baghdadi is not a legitimate ruler to permit jihad. In addition, 
ISIS long before the Caliphate announcement had initiated war against Iraq. 
If the group justifies its military attacks as jihad because the Caliph Abubakr 
authorises it now, what about the war in which the group had engaged since 
the beginning of 2000s and caused the death and injury of hundreds of 
thousands of innocent people and devastation of the country (Monthly Civilian 
deaths from Violence). 
 The ISIS war is the most indiscriminate and horrific war of this 
century. The group violated all the humanitarian rules prescribed in the Quran, 
traditions of the prophet Muhammad and practices of the early Caliphs that 
almost all overlap the modern humanitarian rules applicable during armed 
conflict today. ISIS carried out many widespread and systematic attacks 
against the Iraqi and Syrian civilian populations and committed crimes against 
humanity including murder, extermination, enslavement, persecution of 
minorities and women on the grounds of religion, ethnicity and gender, 
enforced disappearance and other inhuman acts of similar character. The 
military operations of the group against the Iraqi and Syrian military forces 
were accompanied with large-scale war crimes including willful killing, 
attacking protected people and objects, killing prisoners of war, using 
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prohibited weapons, forcible displacement, rape, sexual slavery and forced 
pregnancy, shelling residential areas and child recruitment ( UNAMI and 
OHCHR, 5 June-5 July 2014: 9-14; UNAMI and OHCHR, 6 July-10 
September 2014: 5-17; UNAMI and OHCHR, 11 December 2014-30 April 
2015: 10-23; UNAMI and OHCHR, 1 May-31 October 2015: 8-19; UNAMI 
and OHCHR, 1November 2015-30 September 2016: 4-15; UNHRC, 13 
August 2014: 4-22; UNHRC, 14 November 2014: 4-13; UNHRC, 5 February 
2015; UNHRC, 11 February 2016; UNHRC, 11 August 2016). ISIS attacked 
the Yazidi religious minority in the Iraqi northern Ninewa governorate with 
intent to destroy the group in whole. Consequently, it killed many members of 
the group, caused serious bodily and mental harm to many others, inflicted 
conditions of life with intent to destroy the group physically, imposed 
measures to prevent births within the group and forcibly transferred the Yazidi 
children to their territories (UNAMI and OHCHR, August 2016; Amnesty 
International, 2014; UNHRC, 15 June 2016; Human Rights Watch, 5 April 
2016).  
 Most of the contemporary Islamic scholars have expressed their 
opinion on ISIS. The Saudi Salafi scholar, Abdul Aziz al-Fawzan defines ISIS 
as “a rogue, external criminal organization” (Ladadwi, 2014). The Syrian Sufi 
scholar, Muhammad al-Yacoubi describes the ISIS members as deviators (Al-
Yaqoubi, 2015: xi). The Grand Imam of al-Azhar in Egypt, Sheikh Ahmed al-
Tayeb argues that it is painful to see that crimes are committed to restore the 
Islamic Caliphate (Egypt’s Al Azhar denounces IS, 2014). The International 
Union of Muslim Scholars believes that the ISIS Caliphate is ‘null and void’ 
(Prominent Scholars declare ISIS, 2014). The Egyptian Muslim brotherhood 
scholar, Yusuf al-Qaradawi states that it is the whole Muslim community that 
gives the title of Caliph and not a group (Goodenough, 2014). The Iraqi Shiite 
cleric, Ayatullah Ali al-Sistani asks people to fight the group and defend their 
places (Chulov, 2014).  
 Although the Islamic identity of ISIS is not arguable, the group is much 
politically motivated. ISIS, in other words, is a part of the political and military 
conflicts between the Sunni and Shi’a powers. The war of the group is a proxy 
political war in the name of Islam that is aimed at weakening the Shi’a 
domination and strengthening the Sunni hegemony in the region. The ISIS war 
not only lacks the Islamic jurisprudential elements of reason, purpose, 
circumstance, legitimacy of its Caliph and adherence to humanitarian rules to 
be defined as jihad but also such a war is prohibited in Islam. 
  
Conclusion 
 Islam is a religion that claims to be the extension of the previous divine 
messages. It, like all the other religions and ideologies, promotes peace and 
allows war in specific circumstances. War in Islam is known as jihad; 
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however, jihad is war by all spiritual and physical means in the way of God. 
Classical scholars categorize combative jihad into defensive and offensive 
jihad. Defensive jihad is defined as self-defence against aggression while 
offensive jihad is meant to be global war to deliver the massage of Islam. The 
majority of modern scholars advocate the defensive nature of combative jihad 
as Muslims can easily resort to civil means to convey their message to the 
world.  However, there are also some unpopular scholars and small radical 
groups who still support the idea of global combative jihad. In both cases, 
most of the classical and modern scholars believe that jihad must be waged 
under the authorisation of a legitimate ruler and Muslim fighters must respect 
humanitarian rules. ISIS is a radical Islamic group that was formed in 2013. 
However, the group was the extension of some other radical groups that had 
been operating in Iraq since the beginning of 2000s. ISIS attacked the Shi’a 
Islamic countries of Iraq and Syria between 2013 and 2014 to separate the 
Sunni areas from the two countries and establish a Sunni state. Although the 
group announced an Islamic Caliphate, it was not a religious goal but rather to 
justify the legitimacy of its state and undermine the Shi’a domination in the 
Middle East. The group further asked Muslims to pledge allegiance to its 
leader but the majority of Muslims refused to entrust him with such a position. 
Finally, ISIS violated all the Islamic humanitarian rules applicable during 
battle and committed all the grave crimes shock the conscience of mankind. 
Hence, the ISIS war does not fulfill the jurisprudential conditions of reason, 
purpose, authorization of a legitimate ruler and adherence to humanitarian 
rules. Such a war is prohibited in Islam, let alone be defined as jihad.  
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